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INTRODUCTION 
In view of the widespread transformations affecting the world economy (Coutu and 
Murray, 2005), observers are increasingly noting the inadequacy of efforts, dating back 
to Fordism, to theorize industrial relations, particularly the systems model (Dunlop, 
1958) and the strategic model (Kochan, Katz and McKersie, 1986). These models 
feature only three actors: unions, employers, and the government, which interact 
primarily within the framework of the Nation-State:  
(Translation)[A structurationist approach to industrial relations] allows us to 
recognize the potential fluidity or plasticity of institutions, particularly during times 
of major social transformations. In industrial relations, one could hypothesize that 
the Fordist (or Keynesian) crisis and the attempts to break free from these 
regulations in a fast-paced era of globalization, is one such episode of major 
transformation. That is why we think it is justified to study the boundaries between 
industrial relations systems or the social practices that contribute, on a small or 
large scale, to their systemization (Bellemare and Briand, 2006, p. 11).  
In a context where new emergent actors are making a significant impact on industrial 
relations, business-to-business (B2B) technology services companies (B2BTSC) are 
good subjects to study regarding emergent modes of the regulation of labour because 
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of their extensive exposure to international competition on the product and 
international labour markets. As part of the knowledge economy, they hire highly 
qualified information technology professionals. The study of work-life balance (WLB) 
in this segment of the labour market sheds light on the wider canvas of industrial 
relations and human resource management (HRM) practices in the so-called new 
economy.  
Given that modes of regulation are emerging from these situations, new actors and new 
issues should be integrated into theoretical models of industrial relations (IR) systems 
if their current complexities are to be explained. This article re-examines the classical 
identification of IR actors and illustrates its flaws with the case of the B2B sector in 
the Montreal Area. To demonstrate the presence of actors who are as important as they 
are unrecognized in the IR system of this branch of industry, we adopt Bellemare’s 
(2000) definition of the IR actor and discuss how it impacts the definition of the 
boundaries of IR systems. The case study of the B2BTSC is used here as an example 
that supports the relevance of a wider theoretical framework in progress rather than 
developed. This example is used as part of a plea for a theoretical renewal and in that 
way of reasoning, addresses the question: are there new modes of regulation in this 
economic sector and if so, are there new actors besides the traditional employer – 
employees – state IR triangle? As we conclude so, our example supports our wider 
case but is not generalised at this early state; it will be added to a bank of examples 
that feeds the work towards theoretical renewal of IR.  
THE ACTOR CONCEPT IN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS SYSTEMS 
Bellemare (2000) put forward the first analytical and operationalized definition of an 
actor in industrial relations. Previously, this concept had seemed to have an essentially 
accurate and sufficient definition imbedded within itself, making any analytical 
operationalization seem irrelevant. In both the systemic (Dunlop, 1958) and the 
strategic models (Kochan, Katz, and McKersie, 1986), only three actors were 
recognized in IR: workers and their unions, employers and their associations, and 
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government organizations, whose function is to assist the first two actors in their 
relations.  
However, there have been more pressing calls since the mid-1990s for a broader 
concept of the IR actor, especially one that would reflect social movements; thus, 
Collins (2006), Piore (1995) and Dabscheck (1994) appealed for inclusion of interest 
groups such as women, the disabled, ethnic minorities, homosexuals, and others into 
the study of IR. Practitioners in the field, whether unions or employers’ associations, 
had long been striving to take these groups into account (Briskin, 2006) and did not 
wait for the renewal of the theoretical models to include them. Since the 2000s, authors 
like Kochan (2000), Hyman (2004), Edwards (2005) and the ones gathered in the BJIR 
(2006), have promoted the inclusion of the study of the relations of IR system actors 
with local communities and national and international social movements, which in our 
view means that it is necessary to take into account the fluctuating boundaries of IR 
systems instead of promoting static analytical models. In Québec, there have been 
cases of intra-union interest groups fighting for equity and the respect of fundamental 
labour rights in relation to gender or age in collective agreements negotiated by their 
unions (Brunelle, 2002; Legault, 2005a In the North American tradition of industrial 
relations, the main way to approach this kind of situation was through the intra-party 
attitudinal structuration in the theory of collective bargaining (for example, Walton, 
McKersie 1995). Yet, in the latter cases, we have to account for the fact that some 
groups in a unionized context rely on the support of extra-unions organizations (in 
these cases, feminist and human rights groups) to defend their cause at work, bringing 
non-union actors in the field and, moreover, bringing judicial authorities other than 
labour judicial bodies in the field. More than a problem in aggregating members’ 
interests, we face a new step in the defence of rights at work, where unionized workers 
look beyond their union to defend their interests at work and against these same 
unions. These actions and actors come to have a direct effect in the working conditions 
in these unionized contexts, and this, not only without but despite the local union’s 
action.  
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After studying Quebec public transit user groups from 1975 to 2000, Bellemare (2000) 
demonstrated that these groups were actors in this IR system. Through persistent 
action, they exerted a durable influence on a new concept and production of public 
transit service, even becoming actors in the co-production, co-design, and co-
surveillance of service and work relationships and in the adoption of new labour laws. 
Using his empirical study, Bellemare proposed a structurationist definition of the actor 
as the foundation for an operationalized analytical framework of IR action. The 
concept of IR means the set of actors, rules, institutions, and subjects of the social 
relations of production in modernity and late modernity; these elements are defined in 
the following section. Action is the ability to modify one’s environment and to 
intentionally or unintentionally produce consequences through one’s behaviour 
(Bellemare, 2000, p. 385). Bellemare thus defined the IR system actor as an individual, 
group, or institution with the ability to influence, through its action, the direction of IR 
(direct action) or the actions of other IR actors (indirect action; Bellemare, 2000, 
p. 386). For example, unions do not have the power to legislate labour matters but they 
can influence the State through lobbying and get government to take action on their 
demands. In the resulting model (Figure 1), an actor not only must act in order to be 
recognized as an actor, but he must also have the ability to get other actors to take his 
aspirations into consideration and to respond favourably to some of them.  
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Figure 1. Flexible Actor Model of Industrial Relations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the new analytical framework proposed, the traditional dichotomy between actors 
and non-actors in industrial relations is set aside in favour of the influence continuum 
resulting from the actions of individuals, groups, and institutions whose importance as 
IR actors varies in time and space. In the classical approaches, individuals and sub-
groups of unions, for example, were not considered actors.  
Actors in a given IR system assume their role in multiple ways in an organization’s or 
a sector’s internal social relations as they influence the organization of work, the 
management of human resources, and the determination of working conditions. In 
various IR system dimensions, their action can vary in intensity (occasional or 
continuous), scope (limited to the organization or extended to include regulatory 
institutions), or outcome (lead to or impose large-scale durable transformation or 
remain circumscribed and prompt minor changes). This definition of actor has had 
productive applications in various national and international IR contexts
1
; its 
                                            
1
  This concept was used by Bellemare and Ackéyi (1999) in their analysis of the role of actors such as 
the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund in Gabon, and was afterward applied to an 
organization of miners’ wives in Australia (Jones, 2002), and to European Union experts in the 
implementation of national industrial relations policy (Baldacchino, 2001). It was used by Michelson 
in relation to the role of chaplains in Australian businesses (2006), by Bell (2006) on the same topic 
in England, by Abbott (2006) in relation to the role of citizen advisory boards that advise non-
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explanatory power isn’t limited to the B2BTSC sector, of course. We here limit the 
study to this particular empirical case. 
In our study, clients and project teams in B2BTSC are IR actors, if, by their action, 
they can directly or indirectly influence the direction of IR or HR policy or the actions 
of other IR actors. We will show that they act on an intra-enterprise and inter-
enterprise basis (work-site, organizational), on all aspects of the work relations (co-
production, co-conception and co-surveillance), with a continuous action that has 
major and durable impact on the working conditions of these workers 
Three precisions must be added to this definition. First, as Abbot (2006) has shown, 
when he has used Bellemare’ framework, it is not fully essential for the actor to have 
an action at all levels and every moment to exert an impact on the definition of work 
conditions or frontiers of the IR system.  
Second, this definition of actor, grounded in the structuration theory of Giddens 
(1984), itself grounded in the critical realist epistemology of Bhaskar (1975, see 
Edwards 2005), poses that the definition of who is and is not an IR actor is context 
sensitive or space-time sensitive: one can be an actor in a particular case and not in 
another case. By example, Bellemare (2000) has identifed the users groups in the case 
of Montreal city transit system as actors between 1975-2000, but this was probably not 
the case in the Gatineau transit system at the same period. This is the conceptual and 
analytical definition that has a good generalization potential, not the empirical new 
actors that can be identified with it.  
Third, in this definition of the actor, the traditional IR actors: union, employers and 
state agencies, because they are the most directly involved in the work relation will 
undoubtedly always be identified as actors. The most relevant question in this case 
become to what extent do they have an impact on the particular IR system in which 
they intervene? The answer is more empirical-analytical than based on an a piori basis. 
                                                                                                                              
unionized employees on problems in the workplace, and by Peltonen (2006) in relation to the status 
of the multinational in the industrial relations system.  
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For example, probably that the soviet unions in the 1960’s where IR actors in Russia, 
but did they have the same kind of impact than had the Canadian unions at the same 
time, considering that the Russian unions were subservient to the communist party? 
The IR system model proposed by Jones and Bellemare (2005) considerably expands 
upon the concept of the outcomes of the IR system (Figure 1, in italics). In traditional 
models, they are summed up by collective agreements, organizational performance, 
and by the number of strikes and grievances. In the new model, new and old actors are 
given the power to produce results in the form of new modes of regulation and new 
social relations parties. 
THE SHIFTING BOUNDARIES OF THE IR SYSTEM  
Beginning in the 1940s, IR theories essentially adopted a Fordist perspective as they 
designed the employment relationship around the control of wage earners by contracts 
of undetermined length, and legal subordination. The form of the firm is changing, 
however, into a post-bureaucracy, post-Taylorist, network-firm (Briand and Bellemare, 
2006, 2005; Legault, 2005b). New forms are giving rise to a multitude of employee 
statuses. The organizational entity relevant to IR is not necessarily the legal 
organization-employer structure. An entire stream of research is developing around the 
view of the firm’s boundaries as being porous and movable and the consequences 
arising from these conditions for management and HRM practices, such as 
boundaryless careers (Arthur & Rousseau, 1996; Fleming and Spicer, 2004; 
Heracleous, 2004).  
In this study, the actions of clients and project teams as IR actors are observed as they 
relate to the organization of work and the institution (political decision making in the 
organization). From the sociology of work we learn that the distribution of work 
requires coordination and is possible only if the organization of work is conceived, 
executed and, of course, supervised. However, these tasks have assumed new forms 
that emerged since Taylorism. The study of these two groups will show how they 
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fulfill the role of co-producers, co-supervisors, and co-designers of the service and 
therefore become major players in this particular IR system.  
The concept of co-production suggests that the action of a goods or service user 
intentionally or unintentionally influences the manner, effectiveness, and outcome of a 
service. Actors to at various degrees may seek this co-production and be more or less 
controlled while doing so. The user or client is a co-producer in the service sector, to 
degrees that vary according to the service’s level of sophistication. In the restaurant 
industry, for example, this stakeholder acts less efficiently than in the consulting 
industry. 
Similarly, the receiver of the service may be a co-supervisor of the work (while at 
times being supervised himself), both in an individual capacity (by making complaints, 
for example) and as part of a group, by participating in pressure groups or setting up 
and implementing various supervisory specifications internally (grievance committees, 
users’ committees, board of directors) and externally (creating a system to gather user 
complaints, or users obtaining legal recourse before the courts).  
Lastly, the receiver of the service may be a co-designer of that product or service and 
could thus interfere with the standards and prescriptions of the company’s 
management by requesting another product or delivery method. For example, the 
receivers may be invited individually, collectively, during discussion groups, or as 
representatives of user groups to help define their needs and the products and 
production methods, and to evaluate the quality of products or services. The more the 
service is complex, the need imprecise, and the anticipated result unforeseen, the more 
the receiver’s involvement is requested. Receivers may also volunteer their own 
participation and lobby individually or collectively for a greater role as co-developers 
of a product. This is what the feminist movement did in the health sector in the 1970s, 
at a time when women decided to no longer allow the mostly male medical profession 
to dictate their needs and the type of care for their situation. Similarly, public transit 
user groups have made similar demands.  
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METHOD 
We used the following sample of five organizations of the new economy and two 
traditional large bureaucracies to make our comparisons: 
- Three small B2BTS businesses (IT-1, IT-2, and IT-3);  
- Two businesses that develop optics and telecommunications products (Optics I and Optics 
2);  
- Two bureaucracies:  
- The IT department of an insurance company (Insurance-I),  
- The IT department of a real estate management company (Real Estate).  
The organizations in the first group had between 100 and 150 employees, while those 
in the second group had between 500 and 1,000. None of the employees in any of the 
groups were unionized. Data were collected on a wide range of topics regarding story 
of the organization, HR policies in general and towards WLB in particular, work 
content of individuals and detailed work organisation, including lengthy accounts of 
project management. 
For most of their activities, all the organizations keep a constant flow of 
communication with clients and use the management by project method. In keeping 
with widespread current trends, the IT departments in the two bureaucracies had been 
organized into independent centres providing service to the entire organization, with 
instructions to deliver service with optimal returns. As such, they competed with 
external firms and were in danger of being abolished if their competitors were cheaper 
and management used their services instead. Although the bureaucracies’ IT 
departments were studied for comparative purposes, they organized work in the same 
manner even though they operated in different organizational contexts.  
A total of 88 respondents participated in the survey (43 men and 45 women) between 
January 2001 and April 2002. In each organization, we interviewed one or two human 
resource managers, two to four immediate supervisors (project managers, team 
managers)—usually a man and a woman—and 10 to 12 employees (equal numbers of 
men and women) working in computer or software engineering, often as qualified 
engineers but not always, the recruiting strategies varying much and being part of the 
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clue in these organisations. The in-depth interviews lasted one and a half to two hours, 
and the interview guide was semi-structured. Documentary information regarding the 
seven sites was collected as well. Many questions were posed as standard procedure to 
everyone, so simple descriptive statistics can be summed up, though the study was 
qualitative. Data were analysed with the grounded theory procedure and NVIVO 
software program. Only part of the categories, relevant to our question, will be 
accounted for here; many other publications quoted here account for the rest of the 
study. 
ALTERNATIVE SOURCES OF WORKPLACE REGULATION 
Based on our observations of the B2BTS firms in our study, we suggest that the client 
and the peer team helped establish the production framework in the organization, and, 
in many ways, became a substitute for the human resources department.  
Project management as a form of work organization  
The five SMEs dealt with numerous external clients. The clients of the two 
bureaucracies’ IT departments were the departments of the same firm, and all of them 
used a common work organization method that can be briefly described as follows. 
Each project was a binding contract under which the supplier-organization usually 
provided the client-firm with a deliverable (computer product such as software) and 
also a service (technical support, maintenance, customer service). To produce the 
good, a team was built around a project manager. These teams were multifunctional, 
relatively autonomous, temporary, and constituted according to the client’s needs 
(Alvesson, 1995; DeFillippi, 2003, Legault, 2004). Although short-lived, the teams had 
to produce goods or services to be delivered on a date and at prices established by a 
succession of contracts with several clients. At the term of each project, the team was 
dissolved and the professionals thus freed up were drafted into another team to work 
on new pending projects.  
In a post-Fordist context, these much sought-after professionals have careers that are 
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called boundaryless; that is to say that these careers are characterized by frequent short 
term contracts for different employers, instead of a stable employment relation (Arthur 
& Rousseau, 1996). They are very mobile on the job market, which itself strongly 
encourages their mobility. The concept of employee loyalty, long held as a major 
indicator of employee commitment, is replaced in this industry by a desire to agree to 
anything to satisfy a client within the scope of a project. The commitment thus 
expected is intense, but not necessarily long term. Neither the professional nor the 
employer views a long employment relationship as a priority (Legault, 2004; Singh 
and Vinnicombe, 2000).  
The professionals interviewed in the WLB research were assigned to the production of 
services but rarely involved in the negotiation of contracts in which budgets and 
deadlines are set, even though they were the ones to comply to the extent possible with 
its conditions. Yet budget conditions and deadlines are the key issues in risk: if too 
restrictive, they could lead to the failure of the project, and the professionals and the 
project managers hold the primary responsibility for the project’s success or failure. 
Therefore, the pressure should have been greater in the five SMEs (which have 
external clients) than in the two bureaucracies, but that is not the case: at Insurance-I, 
whose clients were other departments in the same firm, pressure came from within 
because the department had become an independent for-profit centre. At Real Estate, 
the requirements of clients and the pervasive possibility that they might go with a 
competitor exposed the professionals to the same type of pressure that is found in other 
project management scenarios.  
We can already see that this situation sets the client in a key position to establish the 
framework for certain – highly important - working conditions, as the client draws up 
budget and deadlines in a context of fierce competition that spares him/her a large 
freedom of manoeuvre. And yet, this in return determines how many people the firm 
can assign to the project and the working schedules.  
 12 
Human resources departments, a background presence 
The clients did not limit their influence to occasional marginal transformations of 
existing industrial relations practices but actually established the organization’s 
framework for in-house production and wielded numerous decision-making powers 
that in other environments are normally assigned to the human resources (HR) 
department. In three out of the five SMEs in our sample, the HR department had been 
created shortly before our visit. As well, in the firms that had a more structured human 
resources department (two SMEs and the two bureaucracies), the department was not 
involved in the employee-project manager relationship (Legault, 2004).  
The HR department played a negligible role in the decisions that normally are within 
their mandate elsewhere, in hiring matters as well as in issues of vacations, holidays 
and schedules. The following extracts are particularly eloquent:  
[Translation] Well, some of them…when someone leaves the team, it’s usually not 
[the employer’s] decision. (Oh, to that extent?) Yeah, he [the client] has the last 
word. The client decides who gets on the team and who goes: “I’m not happy with 
him, he has to go.” “Yeah, but wait, let’s talk to him first.” ... Then it happened that 
he decided: “That guy goes! We don’t want him anymore. That’s final; he’s rude 
on the phone…” so they said, “No, we don’t want him anymore.” So then they [the 
department] warn him ahead of time: “So in one month, you’re gone, you’re, like, 
going to another project and you’re leaving that team, it’s because of the client.” 
(CGF-1-18-27-8-01-19-3) 
Because in our field, the client makes the decisions about a lot of people. For 
example, when we want a vacation, “Alright, but…we have to check to see if it’s 
o.k. with the client.” (MF-3-22-28-3-01-19-3).  
When assigned to establish working conditions such as the professionals’ hours, work 
schedules, or telecommuting, the project manager made highly variable decisions, 
essentially based on the client’s wishes.  
In these situations, the principal functions of the HR department were to: 
- Ensure that the firm complies with the main public labour laws;  
- Manage the application of its benefits (pensions, if applicable, vacations and holidays, and 
so forth); 
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- Provide the other departments with the workers needed for their operations;  
- Apply sanctions and execute lay-offs or dismissals upon request.  
In this particular context, far from witnessing anomie we see the emergence of new 
sources of regulation taking the place of Fordist regulations in the bureaucratic 
environment (collective agreements, internal regulations and procedures, and labour 
laws). Among others, the client and the peer team emerge as major actors. At the heart 
of all the management decisions of the organizations under study, and in all matters, 
particularly HR, WLB, work organization, and telecommuting (Legault and Chasserio, 
2003), were the clients’ imperatives (tight contract deadlines, pressing need for the 
product), followed by the concerns of the team, whose second imperative, loyalty, was 
subordinated to the client’s needs (each worker had particular skills and had to be 
present in case he was needed, under peril of delaying product delivery).  
Here we can see that the client is no longer outside, talking the managers into his/her 
liabilities, but in fact inside the firm, managing the project’s staff in many daily 
decisions, getting the project manager into relaying his/her decisions. At the work-site 
level, (s)he is continuously involved (high intensity of action, see figure 1) and entails 
major transformations in the internal politics of HRM, as we’ll see, in a durable way. 
CLIENTS AND TEAMS AS CO-PRODUCERS AND CO-DESIGNERS 
OF THE GOOD/SERVICE 
Clients: spectators no longer 
These two roles are examined in the same section because the conception and 
production of a good or service by technology firms are so tightly intertwined in 
B2BTS firms that it would be redundant to separate these functions for analytical 
purposes, as was done in Bellemare’s (2000) study of public transit users.  
Unlike plant workers, these B2BTS professionals interact constantly with clients 
because the products requested are sophisticated, customized, and complex to make. 
The client gets involved to ensure that the product is adaptable to the type of data to be 
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processed, to the information system currently in place at the client’s business, and to 
its users, and so forth. Moreover, the order changes constantly as the development 
cycle goes on. Regardless of the content of the initial contract, the client withdraws or 
adds details to the order during product development when informed by the developer 
of limits and constraints that challenges the initial order, and also of possibilities of 
which he had been previously unaware. This situation excludes any rigid operational 
planning from the outset and forces developers to make accommodations for the 
conflict between the contract’s budget and deadline requirements on the one hand, and 
the client’s constantly evolving demands, additions, and quality expectations on the 
other. 
As the producers were qualified to hold productive discussions with the client because 
of their hermetic knowledge and the specialized nature of the order, management 
transferred the role of transacting with the client during production to them. A major 
part of their work involved diplomacy (Legault, 2005b). The project managers were 
not the client’s exclusive contact, and the professionals were often called upon to work 
at the client’s temporarily.  
Professionals must take into account the client’s requirements from the outset of 
product development, and keep up with changes in these requirements and in 
production deadlines, produce and deliver the finished good to the client within the set 
time, and then provide post-production service. The producer has scant bona fide 
powers of negotiation because contracts are made in a highly competitive market that 
gives clients the lion’s share of the power (Anderson-Gough, Grey and Robson, 2000).  
Thus the members of a team responsible for implementing software in three months, 
for example, had to resolve these conflicts on a daily basis and make logistical 
decisions that invariably had a determinant impact on the project’s success or failure. 
For instance, they had to consider whether it was better to sacrifice one test phase in 
order to adhere to a deadline and thus risk producing a product with bugs, or else put 
quality first by taking their time and risk testing the client’s patience before product 
delivery (Berrebi-Hoffmann, 2002) In the face of such sizeable risks, the optimal 
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solution was often to attempt to do it all, which resulted in unlimited overtime and a 
tremendous amount of commitment from the employees. To adhere to the established 
price, it was necessary to lower production costs, of which the main element was 
manpower. Thus unlimited work hours without compensation for overtime became a 
major asset.  
The client did not limit his contribution to the effectiveness of the service simply by 
being compliant or influencing the production process by sharing his concerns with 
management, but was placed at the very heart of the production process. Clients were 
active at every phase, negotiating each step with the producer. For their part, the 
producers had to keep the clients informed of obstacles and/or new possibilities that 
occur during production. It was the client’s specific orders, rather than a product offer 
determined by a group of managers, that triggered the beginning of the production 
process. The resulting operations did nothing but reinforce the influence of the client, 
who led the service supplier rather than subordinate himself to him. The client and the 
professional were not on an equal footing in terms of competencies, but the 
competitive market confers an undeniable edge on the party that requests the service.  
Let’s make it clear here that the professionals are still salaried employees of their 
firms, in all seven sites; this strong influence of the client doesn’t appear anywhere in 
the juridical structure and remains informal, though very powerful due to two 
important factors: fierce competition and close supervising relation with the 
professionals. This influence is not buffered by the management; on the contrary, the 
responsibility of the client’s satisfaction in all his/her requirements is conveyed to the 
professional, whose assessment will rest mostly on that same satisfaction.  
Here we can see client and professionals in a strong working relationship, because of 
their direct negotiating relationship and, mostly, because of the direct influence of 
client’s requirements on the production process. This, in turn, has a direct influence on 
working conditions, that is to say working time in this particular case, as we will see. 
This is a major and durable outcome of the continuous client’s action on working 
conditions at work-site level (see figure 1).  
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Disapproval of shorter work schedules  
In these B2BTSC, where there is hardly any formalized HRM, there are few policies or 
official rules for scheduling or for workplace organization. In all the companies 
visited, only one had a work time policy, and its application was left to the discretion 
of the project manager and the client. Shorter work schedules were usually denied, 
particularly in the case of part time work and telecommuting arrangements (Legault 
and Chasserio, 2003).  
Shorter work hours were often frowned upon. One of the female project managers we 
interviewed shared this: 
[Translation] When I have people on a four-day workweek, I think they’re not 
ambitious [...]! [...] We have so much work, we push our people, the projects aren’t 
easy, you know… Yet there are people who work four days a week… like the 
saying goes, it’s a bad fit [...] The company does offer it, I’m happy for those 
people, but on the other hand, you look at them and you might not feel like having 
them on your team. When you have a really urgent project … (ASF-3-3-11-7-01-
19-3) 
In short, the obstacles to work organization that lead to the denial of part-time hours 
and that were usually invoked to justify the need to agree to overtime are the client’s 
needs, the needs of the work team, the interaction that was required among team 
members, and the importance of each member’s unique qualifications to a highly 
specialized and skilled production process. The obstacles that were expressed could be 
understood only in light of the contrast between the volume of work and the human 
and financial resources needed to execute the contracts (Legault and Chasserio, 2003). 
Both management and employees (not equally, since the men agreed with the needs 
more than the women did) mentioned these requirements as the basis for their 
disapproval of reduced working hours.  
These qualified technology workers reported more often to the client and to their own 
teams and were more often subject to their authority than to that of their own project 
manager. Our respondents’ highest priority was their own reputation; therefore, they 
were likely to give the client the required flexibility and availability. Reputation is 
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built, approved, and changed by the drafting decisions of project managers and clients, 
and it is the number one placement asset in a highly mobile job market (Berrebi-
Hoffmann, 2002, Courpasson, 2000). The regulatory framework extends to the entire 
draft pool in which each professional covets a place. As the professionals are highly 
mobile, the client’s action level is not just organizational, it’s also local, if not national.  
The main argument against shorter hours that was freely given was that clients do not 
have part-time needs but rather continuous requirements:  
[Translation] It’s part of the game. Yeah. Yeah. A consultant who does 9 to 5, I’m 
convinced that he won’t be a consultant for long. Because there are all types of 
situations that require our availability…There can be a last–minute situation that 
makes it necessary to, well, you know…I’ll give you an example; in my division 
we had a product to make in two days, so there was a chance we had to work both 
nights until midnight to be able to deliver. So that’s a lot…You have to be flexible 
in these cases. Yeah. (CGSH-10-4-12-10-01-19-3) 
Again in this case, the client dictated to the project manager how working hours should 
be managed, for example, by refusing to work with professionals on the team who 
requested shorter hours. For its part, management dictated work hours by leaving the 
implementation of scheduling and overtime compensation policies to the discretion of 
the project managers, who are first and foremost dedicated to the client.  
In short, what we see here is a client directly conveying his/her orders regarding work 
time to the project manager or directly to the professional, in absence of any 
intervention coming from the HR department, even when the firm has some policies 
regarding part time work or overtime billing. The client can directly transform HR 
local policies on working time in a major (calling off their application) and durable 
way (in many projects throughout time; see figure 1).  
The regulatory role of the project team in the co-design production phase 
Shorter work hours and work organization also collided with a second consideration: 
the team itself. The work could not progress unless team members were constantly 
interacting. No one was afraid to say: “When one team member is missing, the work of 
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the rest of the team is delayed”, or that a part-time schedule was unsuitable for 
managers or professionals, who have unique qualifications and might be needed at any 
given moment.  
In the same vein, in denying the opportunity to telecommute, team managers offered 
that the frequent exchanges among team members were a priority that required 
everyone’s co-presence, and that the unique skills of team members meant that 
someone’s absence could delay the whole team. Naturally, the client’s requirements 
concerning the presence and availability of the employees on their project underpinned 
all these comments, either because the team members provided customer support, the 
client wanted to be able to talk to them at any time, or the employee worked at the 
client’s during the duration of the project and the client wanted him to be present.  
On this subject, a female manager at IT-3 said:  
The employees won’t draw up their schedules without taking the others’ into 
consideration, and they also have to get the project leader’s agreement. (DDF-7-7-
6-3-01-19-3) 
The group that supplied the unlimited effort expected would not approve any 
exceptions for a team member because the rest of the group would have to make 
additional efforts to compensate for their absence, and the performance of the team is 
evaluated as a whole. On the other hand, a worker who saw that his freedoms had 
negative consequences for the client or that they burdened his co-workers would not 
impose such compromises on his work environment. The social sanctions of team 
members are to be feared because these colleagues have the power to make 
recommendations to future clients and therefore to influence a professional’s 
reputation. To preserve reputation, the professional imposed all compromises upon the 
family (Legault and Chasserio, 2003).  
We can only observe that the team is collectively driven by the client’s imperatives in 
the same way professionals are; moreover, small arrangements among professionals in 
a team are hindered by the pressure imposed on them as a group.  
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THE CLIENT AS HUMAN RESOURCES CO-SUPERVISOR  
Vanishing control and double-edged autonomy 
Although ostensibly autonomous within their firms, these employees had lost most of 
their control over the way they organize work. Given that the HR department does not 
intervene in the relationships between project managers and employees and gave the 
former a great deal of latitude (Chasserio and Legault, 2005), the client is unchecked in 
his dealings with project managers and the professionals because his role is not 
described in the official organization chart and the challenge of satisfying him is part 
of a consensus that is not formally monitored. Reputation becomes a driving force of 
self-discipline. Indeed, in respondents’ own terms, boundaryless careers and 
management by project turn workers into “consultants” (according to their own terms) 
within the organization that employs them. Indeed, many respondents, still salaried 
employees at their employer’s, had a consultant status at the client’s that “borrows” 
them through a service contract agreement (while being bound to their own employer 
by an employment contract) for the duration of the project. Whether dispatched to the 
clients’ or working at their own employer’s, the workers interacted constantly with the 
client, in contrast to suppliers of manufactured goods in an industrial setting, for 
instance.  
Within our sample, autonomy was viewed equally as a prized working condition and a 
work requirement that came with heavy responsibility. Seventy-six respondents (76%) 
said that they were autonomous in their work, i.e., in the way they organized their 
tasks and carried out projects, but that the project manager monitored compliance with 
deadlines and budgets. Only 9% said they had very little autonomy. The professionals 
also had a great deal of operational autonomy in deciding how to make the product, in 
their interaction with the client, and in the organization of their work, a condition they 
value because it allows them to express their creativity. When asked what their 
employer considered the most important quality of an ideal employee and which asset 
was required of them, autonomy was number one on the list.  
Autonomy is not only a bestowed advantage but also a requirement of the profession 
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that carries heavy obligations and is received in exchange for a commitment to satisfy 
the client. As projects frequently overlap, employees juggle heavy parallel demands 
and establish the order of priorities themselves in the case of conflicting tasks, while 
possibly facing reprimands for the decisions they make. Instructions such as “Do 
whatever it takes to meet this deadline”, or “Here’s the objective, make sure you meet 
it” are inputs into autonomous decision making that foster more stress than 
professional satisfaction (Legault and Belarbi-Basbous, 2006). When faced with a 
problem, our respondents realized quickly that they could always be held accountable 
because of the latitude they were given to establish operational methods and priorities.  
The quest for customer satisfaction is a powerful instrument of control as it is the main 
issue in the crucial evaluation process (Anderson-Gough, Grey and Robson, 2000; 
Courpasson, 2000; p. 193; Legault and Chasserio, 2003). One observes a noticeable—
and inexpensive—regulating effect in the constant internal competition among 
professionals, either among project managers or the members of their team, who were 
seeking for a good position in the next drafting process within their own firm or in 
another firm in the short or medium term, or a position as project manager or else 
simply the maintenance of their own reputation. We must notice that autonomy is in 
fact a way to convey to the professionals the responsibility of negotiating with the 
client and to make them entrepreneurs eager to build their reputation. In the process, 
clients’ needs are prevailing as first determinants of clients’ satisfaction and conditions 
of work as well.  
We must notice here that either the project manager or the HRM department has any 
supervising role; self-censorship of the professional can be relied upon, as they are in 
an entrepreneurial relationship with the client, eager to have him/her satisfied in order 
to keep a spotless portfolio.  
The client and the organization of work: long hours and overtime management 
In most of the organizations visited, there was no provision governing the 
professionals’ compensation for overtime. Sometimes overtime was paid at the same 
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rate as regular work, or the employee was given time off equivalent to the rate of his 
normal pay, or equivalent to time and a half or double time. In other cases, overtime 
was unpaid and the employee was not given time off. The many hours of overtime that 
professionals did were rarely, if ever, paid (Legault and Chasserio, 2003). While not a 
universal practice, it was nevertheless a widespread policy to withhold compensation 
for overtime except in the case of hourly workers and to consider the compensation of 
professionals, which is calculated at an annual rate, as a lump sum that is not tied to a 
specific number of work hours, despite the fact that professionals often put in long 
overtime hours.  
It was the project manager’s responsibility to estimate the number of vacation hours to 
offer as compensation for overtime, but overtime was not necessarily accounted for in 
an official document. The granting of time off for working overtime depended on an 
informal agreement with the current project manager and could be compromised at any 
time, depending on the client’s needs, particularly in relation to budgets and deadlines. 
The project manager determined the threshold that had to be reached before offering 
compensation for accumulated overtime. It was reported that IT-1 issued a moratorium 
on paying overtime rates. This was justified by budget cuts and the fact that “the client 
no longer wished it.”  
In the organizations we studied, the official work week ranged from 35 hours (Real 
Estate and IT-3), to 37.5 hours (Insurance-I, IT-2, and Optics- 2) or 40 hours (Optics-1 
and IT -1). The following table describes the distribution of the real hours that 
respondents consistently, not occasionally, put in throughout the year
2
.  
Table 1 
Real work hours by gender 
Hours worked per week Women (n = 45) Men (n = 43) 
Adherence to the hours 
stipulated in the work 
contract  
18 (40%) 7 (16.3%) 
35- to 39-hour work week 6 (13%)  
                                            
2
  There were wide gaps between the men and the women, which are discussed elsewhere (Chasserio 
and Legault, 2005).  
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including overtime 
40- to 49-hour work week 
including overtime 
18 (40%) 26 (60%) 
50-to 59-hour work week 
including overtime 
3 (6.6%) 9 (21%) 
60+ hour work week 
including overtime 
0 1 
 
Long work hours are characteristic of work organization in the B2BTS industry 
(Hellens, Nielsen and Trauth, 2001) and of the knowledge economy (Alvesson, 2000; 
Bailyn, 1993; Evetts, 1998; Perlow, 1999; Simpson, 1998; Singh and Vinnicombe, 
2000). Work hours are one of the factors for measuring employee commitment in this 
sector, which in turn is a major factor in determining who gets a promotion. Employees 
are judged on their “presenteeism”, or the many overtime hours they willingly agree to 
do (Bailyn, 1993, p. 79). 
To illustrate, here is a quote from a project leader with Insurance-I who very clearly 
articulated the commitment she expected from her employees: 
[Translation] I expect an employee to give his all…in terms of productivity. Yes, 
he can enjoy his work and continue to learn … […] even find personal satisfaction 
in it, but he should give his best. After all, we’re professionals, we’re well paid, so 
I expect that those people, when they’re at work, give the most they can. (ASF-3-3-
11-7-01-19-3)  
The employees were encouraged to give the “necessary time” rather than a fixed 
number of hours to their work.  
We must not see this autonomy in assessing what the “necessary time” is as the 
freedom to determine it; in this assessing process, the clients’ needs are prevailing and 
the respondents’ discourse on this topic is obvious. In all this, client’s action is 
continuous, major (as in turning down an overtime compensation policy) and durable, 
not an exception. 
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CLIENT AND TEAM AS ACTORS OF REGULATION 
Entrepreneurial discourse and consensus perception  
The customer service attitude expressed as entrepreneurial discourse was evident in the 
respondents’ remarks, despite the fact that they were salaried workers. For example, 
when asked about how they viewed work and success, their priorities were customer 
satisfaction, being useful and solving the customer’s problems, and respecting the 
deadlines and the agreed-upon budget. Other dimensions of professional success were 
secondary, such as job satisfaction, continuous learning, and satisfying the boss’s 
requirements. Thus, the concept of commitment among professionals had shifted 
substantially from loyalty to one’s employer to temporary but total loyalty to the client 
(Anderson-Gough, Grey and Robson, 2000; Singh and Vinnicombe, 2000).  
Did this make the client and the team actors in the industrial relations system? Yes it 
did, at least from one significant standpoint. These actors did no less than relieve the 
employer of his regulatory role and unburden him from the inevitable tensions created 
by the conflicting interests of capital and work, the effect of which was to make these 
work environments high-consensus organizations. The professionals asserted that 
individual performance ensured the organization’s competitive position on the market, 
and consequently, the client’s satisfaction secured their own jobs (Singh and 
Vinnicombe, 2000). They integrated this constraint so thoroughly that their perception 
could be equated with a shared interest with the leadership of their organization. 
Bending to the clients’ very high demands is due to globalization and generates stress 
that respondents viewed as resulting from the client’s power, not the employer’s: 
[Translation] Yes, we evaluate all the tasks to be done, the schedule for doing them 
(...). In 90% of cases, the client wants it done in half the time. So we end up sort of 
compressing the length of time that would have been more ideal. So our people 
who manage projects feel the stress because they’re handed a project that doesn’t 
give them much latitude with the deadlines (DSF-13-1-23-8-01-19-3). 
Among salaried workers, this situation can only be explained by the mobility of 
experts in a post-Fordist salaried work market where loyalty to one employer no longer 
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makes sense. The professional considers himself/herself all the more autonomous 
because the demand is constant. The organization is just one of the places where 
professionals belong, and they have multiple loyalties, including to their clients 
(Alvesson, 2000; Robertson and Swan, 2003). In this context, boundaryless careers are 
an additional factor in the production and reproduction of the mode of regulation of the 
work begun under the client’s control. But boundaryless careers establish themselves 
within a labour-regulating framework in which power relations are asymmetrical. 
Levels and modes of labour regulation  
At this stage, the client’s action had a determinant effect, either directly, for example 
by demanding that a particular worker be assigned to or released from a project, or 
when evaluating individuals, the project manager or the team, and so forth, or 
indirectly, by co-constructing the product or service with the requirement that the sub-
contracted company adapt to his own deadlines and schedules, and so forth. This direct 
action is far different from the indirect client’s action on the manufacturing 
organisation, for instance; in that latter case, the client has an indirect action in 
deciding to patronize or not, at most negotiating prizes.  
The team, for its part, required the co-presence of all its members and a uniform level 
of contribution to the collective effort. While the sociology of work has often 
documented the regulatory role of the work group to counter the mounting 
requirements of management (Bendix, 1974; Reynaud 1988; Sayles, 1958), we find the 
opposite situation here because the work team helped intensify the work, whether it 
was paid or not. For salaried workers, their job was on the line in the medium term. 
The team, just as much as the project manager, was capable of marginalizing a 
professional, of keeping him from participating in projects that might be gratifying in 
terms of money, learning, and reputation, and, most of all, of reducing his 
employability by tarnishing his reputation.  
For the professional, the boundaries of the firm he works for are a limited regulatory 
framework on two fronts. First, the current client is a major actor of this regulation, so 
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the regulation space far exceeds the legal boundaries of the direct company/employer. 
This regulation takes precedence over the national legal framework, which is loosely 
followed (additional hours can be refused under section 59.0.1 of the Act respecting 
labour standards, but this provision has no effect in this environment. A salaried 
worker may well refuse to work, but his reputation would be tarnished. The same holds 
true for parental leave or personal leave for family matters, and so forth). Second, 
reputation is at the heart of the sector-based regulation of professional work in this 
industry. It is the object of a co-construction among the actors involved in the project 
over the short term, and among the actors of the sector, at least regionally, over the 
medium term. To build a reputation (or to lose it), one must in fact work or have 
worked on more than one project and for more than one client. Therefore, each of the 
worker’s decisions feeds into this company/short-term and sector-based/long-term co-
construction of the regulation of labour, and these two time-space contexts of labour 
regulation are articulated or interrelated at local as well as international level (see 
figure 1). 
CONCLUSION 
A study of a fairly evenly distributed (by gender) sample of 88 professionals in 
B2BTSC companies identified the regulatory practices that call into question not only 
the traditional terms of Fordist regulation, which until very recently dominated 
bureaucracies that employ B2BTS professionals, but also the traditional boundaries of 
the IR system from two perspectives: that of the three principals actors—the 
employers, the workers and the State—through the addition of clients and work teams, 
and the separation of the IR system’s contexts from the IR system itself.  
The clients had various means at their disposal, and their actions had undeniable scope, 
continuity, as well as undeniable results. There was no longer the question of changes 
brought about by the clients’ action because the clients’ influence actually gave rise to 
an all-encompassing method of organizing work. Clearly, this outcome was related to 
the client’s action—his commands were given and they were obeyed by the 
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employees, the teams, the project leaders, and management, which approved the 
contract’s stipulations in response to conditions the client imposed.  
This particular case, as that of the public transit users documented by Bellemare 
(2000), shows that what may be traditionally considered a contextual dimension of the 
IR system must sometimes be analyzed as the emergence of new actors in IR. Through 
their action, these actors influenced the social relations of work directly as well as 
indirectly. 
This case also shows that inter-organizational relations are one of the issues in social 
relations. Historically they were analyzed through categories like mergers, 
acquisitions, and strategic alliances, but the emergence of what some call the post-
bureaucracy organization or the network organization appears to have given a new 
meaning to this issue. As a topic of research, this relationship mode shifts the subject 
of inter-organizational power relations from legal forms of property and contracts to 
the negotiation of the organization’s regulatory boundaries. Organizations positioned 
poorly in this relationship of power witness the invasion of the boundaries of their 
service company, as in the cases studied in this research, while others safeguard their 
boundaries better (Swart, Kinnie 2003), in accordance with our context sensitive 
definition of actors and IR systems.  
These observations do not necessarily mean that the client is usually or frequently an 
actor in the IR system. The eventual standardization of products offered by B2BTS 
companies in a context of supplier oligopolization might allow them to reverse this 
inter-organizational power relationship and open up new ways to regulate labour 
relations.  
This case study, and the other studies that used Bellemare’s (2000) analytical 
framework of the IR actor, confirms the need to develop a new theory of labour 
relations within a dynamic rather than a static framework that has varying geometries. 
The various attempts to escape Fordist (or Keynesian) regulation in an era of 
increasing globalization are an incentive to observe the transformation of the 
 27 
boundaries of the IR system.  
The results presented here about emergent modes of regulation suggest that there is a 
need for future research to further explore the issue of the various space-time contexts 
of the regulation of work, which are sometimes complementary and sometimes in 
opposition, and also to look at modes of regulation. Some of our results show that 
formal legal regulations are not necessarily the most important and that other modes of 
regulation, for example, those that are based on reputation, may be very effective.  
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